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 Container Shipping-The Pearl River Delta (PRD) Market   
 
An overview of the container throughput for ports in PRD region over the last decade 
 
Over the past decade, container ports in the PRD region have enjoyed a considerably 
advantageous position and experienced rapid development in terms of port container 
throughput growth. All eyes of the shipping industry and its allied industries have been 
focused on container volume growth globally, and as such the port throughput and 
development of the PRD region located in the southern China have been observed 
enthusiastically. 
 
Following the rapid development situation of container ports in Hong Kong, Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou, we hereby present an overview of the container throughput for these ports over 
the last decade in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Container Throughput for HKP, SZP and GZP from 2004 to 2013 
 
Sources:  UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013 
  World Bank Container Port Traffic 
  Hong Kong Marine Department, Port and Maritime Statistics, 2004-2012 
  C Y Tung International Centre for Maritime Studies, TEU Forecasts 
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henzhen has grown remarkably over the last ten years, especially, and from 2004 to 
2008 when its container throughput increased 11.4%. However, when taking a look at 
Guangzhou port, it is impressive that it has gained even more incredible growth during 
the same period with an increase of 233% in its container throughput. Moreover, Guangzhou 
has been able to sustain the container throughput growth even during the hardship year 
brought by the financial crisis. In addition, container throughput in Guangzhou port has been 
growing without interruption since 2004, while Shenzhen and Hong Kong, as is shown in 
Figure 1, both had a drop in their container throughput during the post financial crisis year.  
 
Hong Kong is more like a mature and stable player. Except for the reduction after the 
financial crisis, its container throughput has always been experiencing small scale increase. 
The port throughput in terms of each year ranked the first among the PRD region nine times 
during the period. Presently, Shenzhen‟s container port is officially taking place of Hong 
Kong and is ranked in third place globally. In the following we will take a closer look at what 
has been happening and what led to the current situation in Hong Kong. The year 2012 seems 
to have been the turning point because from that point Shenzhen Port‟s throughput has risen 
above Hong Kong Port‟s. Reviewing the port throughput and development in the PRD region, 
there are various factors that could be counted as the change engine of container volume 
growth. 
 
Shen Zhen proactively develops its multi modes of transport, especially by way of utilizing 
sea, rail and inland road transportation. As such the hinterland of Shenzhen port has expanded 
from the PRD region to cities such as Chongqing, Kunming, Changsha, and Nanchang, 
thereby ensuring a large number of customers and large amount of cargo. In terms of 
geography, Hong Kong Port is always the biggest competitor under the condition that the 
demand for cargo transportation is fixed. However, Shenzhen has been able to solicit 
transshipment transportation from its competitor, Hong Kong, due to its overall 
cost-effectiveness. Specifically, the overall handling cost for exporting a twenty-foot 
equivalent unit of container is 1, 200 CNY lower than it is in Hong Kong. This may explain 
why the amount of transshipment service in Shenzhen has risen sharply in recent years.   
 
Though it was only a matter of time for Shen Zhen to overtake Hong Kong, there are some 
other factors which could further illustrate Hong Kong‟s decline. Industry observers take the 
stance that three major factors have led to the decrease of transshipment containers in Hong 
Kong: (1) The Hong Kong Port Strike which lasted 38 days had an impact on port operation 
which was later indicated in the drop in Hong Kong‟s container throughput. (2) 
Geographically, Hong Kong itself has neither hinterland nor connectivity to a possible distant 
hinterland. As a result, limited terminals and yards become too busy dealing with extra 
businesses. (3) With the establishment and development of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone, Hong Kong‟s transshipment business shrunk. International fleets to East China that 
used to transship via Hong Kong port can now directly export and import through Shanghai 
port.       
 
S 
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It is worth noting that, in the face of Hong Kong‟s losing out in the container throughput of 
2013, industrial observers, analysts and governmental officials all agreed that container 
throughput is not the only indicator of port development. The port allied industries such as 
logistics and high value financial services are the real competitiveness of Hong Kong. 
Furthermore, the 100 percent free trade convenience that Hong Kong offers should not be 
supplanted by Shenzhen within a short time frame.  
 
In the future, whether these two star ports would collaborate with each other in different 
divisions of work or compete with each other for the same port services cannot be predicted. 
What we can be pretty sure about is that the pace of port modernization and mechanization 
would increase in both two ports.   
 
The impact the PRD regional economic growth has on its ports’ throughput   
 
The main indications of the PRD regional economic growth would incorporate the gross 
domestic products (GDP), foreign direct investment (FDI), the gross product value of 
industries (GPVI), and the trade volume of import and export (TVIE) when analyzing 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen‟s economic growth. However, the economic growth composition 
of Hong Kong, as it is an international financial centre, varies from those of Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen. For example, gross product value of industries is used to evaluate the industrial 
development of a mainland city, while Merchandise Trade and Service Trade indicators are 
mainly used to measure Hong Kong‟s economic development.    
 
Table 1. Main economic indicators of Guangzhou, 2004-2013 
Indicators 
GDP            
100 million yuan 
GPVI           
100 million yuan 
FDI            
100 million USD 
TVIE           
100 million USD 
2004 4450.55 5749.48 24.01 447.88 
2005 5154.23 6767.96 26.49 266.68 
2006 6081.86 8112.4 29.32 323.77 
2007 7140.32 9875.79 32.86 379.03 
2008 8287.38 111468.4 36.23 819.33 
2009 9138.21 12355.46 37.73 766.85 
2010 10748.28 14438.99 39.79 1037.68 
2011 12423.44 16624.18 42.70 1161.72 
2012 13551.21 17090.18 45.75 1171.67 
2013 15420.14 17310.24 48.04 1188.88 
Source: www.gzstats.gov.cn 
 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen are definitely two large contributors to the GDP growth in 
Guangdong province, which has had the highest GDP in China for 24 years. Guangdong has 
in particular made itself the country‟s largest exporter, and hence Shenzhen and Guangzhou, 
two PRD cities, handled a large quantity of import and export. How are the port container 
throughput growth and PRD regional economic growth related? Table 1 and Table 2 present 
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the main regional economic indicators of Guangzhou and Shenzhen, respectively. Table 3 
presents the main economic indicators of Hong Kong. 
 
Table 2. Main economic indicators of Shenzhen, 2004-2013 
Indicators 
GDP            
100 million yuan 
GPVI           
100 million yuan 
FDI            
100 million USD 
TVIE           
100 million USD 
2004 4282.14 8588.83 23.5 1472.83 
2005 4950.91 10174.54 29.7 1828.17 
2006 5813.56 12278.48 32.7 2373.86 
2007 6801.57 14362.89 36.6 2875.33 
2008 7786.79 16283.76 40.3 2999.55 
2009 8201.32 15828.63 41.6 2701.63 
2010 9581.51 18879.66 43.0 3467.49 
2011 11505.53 21273.09 46.0 4140.93 
2012 12950.08 20570.86 52.29 4667.85 
2013 14500.23 NA 54.7 5373.59 
Source: www.sztj.gov.cn 
 
Table 3. Main economic indicators of Hong Kong, 2004-2013 
Indicators 
GDP            
100 million USD 
MT 
100 million HKD 
ST 
100 million HKD 
FDI              
100 million USD 
2004 1658.86 41302.37 6556.89 222.16 
2005 1777.72 45796.43 7352.87 409.60 
2006 1899.32 50608.31 9178.28 449.12 
2007 2070.87 55555.24 10388.35 621.10 
2008 2153.65 58494.44 11097.57 670.35 
2009 2093.10 51614.45 9749.89 542.74 
2010 2241.76 63958.59 11731 827.08 
2011 2433.02 71018.49 12902.56 961.25 
2012 2632.6 73465.09 NA 840 
2013 2806.82 NA NA NA 
Note:  MT: Merchandise Trade, ST: Service Trade 
Source: UNCTAD STAT, http://unctadstat.unctad.org 
  Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statisics, www.statistics.gov.hk/pub 
 
Furthermore, as the Port Technology described in its report titled “Port development in East 
Asia: From efficiency enhancement to regional competitiveness”, there would be a 
substantial decline in the already overlapping hinterland, and thus demand for stevedoring 
services among PRD ports. During the past decade, Hong Kong port has faced considerable 
challenges from its geographical neighbors. Presently, with regards to the hinterland access 
costs, manufacturers are relocating their plants from the PRD region to the Yangtze Delta 
region. Therefore, PRD ports now face competition that hardly existed before, and YRD ports 
are gradually becoming the serious market rival of PRD ports. 
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Upcoming analysis: Container Shipping Market – South East Asian Market 
 
The analysis will be available soon in the section of Container Shipping Market, Maritime 
Insight, Volume 2, Issue 2, Summer 2014. Figure 2 presents an overview of the South East 
Asian Ports Throughput and Development over the Last Decade. 
 
Figure 2. South East Asian Ports Throughput and Development over the Last Decade 
Sources:  UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2005-2013 
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 News Highlight  
 
 Ukraine Crisis: Impact on Ukraine’s Corn Export  
 
China, the world‟s largest corn consumer, started importing corn from Ukraine for the first 
time in 2012, as reported by China Daily (April 7, 2012). Ukraine corn‟s lower price was 
particularly attractive to Chinese processing factories. Over the past two years, China saw an 
increase of corn imports from Ukraine, with the country becoming the largest corn export 
after the U.S. and Brazil and planning to ship 18.5 million metric tons of corn in the 2013-14 
season, more than triple the amount three years ago, according to the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.  
 
According to Reuters (March 21, 2014), while China‟s corn imports from the United States, 
the world‟s top exporter, decreased sharply in February this year, hurt by Beijing‟s rejection 
of an unapproved genetically-modified strain, imports from Ukraine surged. China‟s imports 
of non-genetically-modified corn from Ukraine surged to 192, 374 tonnes in February. The 
Financial Times (September 11, 2013) reported that China has a rising appetite for corn 
imports, especially from alternative countries such as Ukraine and Argentina. Late in 2013, 
Ukraine sent its first shipments of corn to China under a loan-for-grains deal. 
 
Would the recent political chaos in Ukraine create uncertainty for its grain market and 
further affect Ukraine‟s crop exports and have a major impact on global food supplies?  
 
Ukraine‟s unrest has pushed up corn prices, reported Rich Nelsen in Agriculture (February 28, 
2014). There has been a sudden turnaround in the price of corn, which was said mainly to be 
due to the unrest in Ukraine. With Russia sending troops into two of Ukraine‟s airports, fear 
of an escalation has led to short covering and speculative traders jumping on board not only 
in the corn market but in beans and wheat as well.  
 
The Wall Street Journal (March 3, 2014) expressed concern as U.S. wheat futures surged 
4.6% due to traders worrying about exports in Ukraine‟s escalating crisis. Corn futures also 
gained from the Ukraine unrest, finishing at their highest price in more than five months.  
 
China is still importing corn from Ukraine even though the country is now at high risk of 
being directly affected by the unrest, with grain shipments from Ukraine to China flowing 
normally, as reported Lloyd‟s List on March 19, 2014.  
 
As China‟s grain imports grow, its connection to Ukraine will also increase. Ukraine‟s plans 
for its agricultural industry are coupled with China‟s need to increase grain imports (The 
Diplomat, February 28, 2014). 
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 To Bypass Malacca Strait by Kra Canal in Thailand 
  
According to Global Times (March 14, 2014), the Thai Canal preparation work has been 
started recently with a centre for preparing the construction of the 100-kilometer-long canal 
being set up. The work team is formed by Chinese construction enterprises. 
   
Kra Isthmus Canal‟s future is actually not in Thai hands: interests-related countries would all 
contribute their capital as well as political leverage in bringing this old idea into reality.  
 
The Strait of Malacca is the doorway to the Indian Ocean from the broader Asia-Pacific 
region and enables the transport of water-borne crude delivery and other strategic resources to 
East Asia‟s many ports, from Manila to Tokyo.  
 
China Daily Mail (March 16, 2014) stated that the trade route to the Indian Ocean through the 
Malacca Straits has the problems of pirates, shipwrecks, haze, sediment and shoals. It has 
twice rate of accidents as the Suez Canal and it is four times higher than the Panama Canal. 
As such, the proposal to build a passageway through southern Thailand as an alternative 
international shipping route to the Strait of Malacca has been recently brought back to the 
table. The proposed canal would significantly cut the shipping distance from eastern Asia via 
the Suez Cannal to Europe, according to Executive Intelligence Review (October 11, 2013). 
The traffic of the Straits of Malacca has been increasing at an annual rate of 20%. The Straits 
is very busy with an estimated one fifth of world trade going through it, which causes 
congestion and increases the cost of trade in the end. Thus it‟s not surprising that the idea of a 
canal through the Kra Isthmus in Thailand has been a topic of interest for seafarers, traders, 
and geostrategists since roughly the late 17
th
 century.  
 
Were the Kra Canal to be build, some countries around the Strait of Malacca would suffer 
somewhat even though the Straits will always be strategically significant for trade. With 
regards to the consequences of constructing the Kra Canal, here we provide some 
speculations made in several media reports. 
 
The Diplomat (December 01, 2013) is concerned that the Thai Canal (Kra Canal) would 
deeply transform the strategic and economic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. While 
Malaysia and Singapore would suffer, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam would benefit 
greatly from the Kra Canal. However, the project would be an opportunity and platform for 
Southeast Asian countries to conduct mutually beneficial trade cooperation. Politically, India, 
Japan and China should be interested in developing such a canal since they would contribute 
capital and political leverage in putting this old idea into practice. 
 
The Nation (December 6, 2013) states that it is an inspiration to cut a channel through 
southern Thailand and it could change the political and economic landscape of the whole 
region. We just cannot help thinking that the Kra Canal, is it a dream or one step closer 
to reality now?
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Trade Allowance – Law and Practice 
 
Dr Wei Fan 
Assistant Vice President, Marketing Lawyer 
Skuld (Far East) LTD 
 
n an ideal world, the shipowner will deliver the 
cargo to the receiver in the same quantity as it was 
loaded if there is no accident during the voyage. 
However the reality is that it is not unusual to find the 
cargo slightly short landed, in particular for the bulk 
cargo or liquid oil product, without any sound 
explanations. This is called trade allowance. You can 
find other names in English cases, such astransit loss 
tolerance, wastage, or transpiration losses and so on. We 
are not going to discuss the scenario where owners 
should be responsible for the loss or shortage, say 
failure to discharge all cargo due to pump breakdown or 
fire loss as this is not trade allowance. Instead we want 
to look into the cases where the loss seems inevitable 
due to the cargo‟s nature, transportation, or handling of 
the goods, or it is due to the imprecise measurement of 
goods and it is not anyone‟s fault. Theoretically 
speaking, the shipowner should not be responsible for it 
at all, or is this actually the case? 
 
Many types of cargo are inclined to shrink, evaporate or 
deteriorate during the carriage, no matter how diligent a 
carrier has been. This type of loss happens without the fault of carriers. Potatoes tend to lose 
water during carriage and they can lose as much as 1% of the total quantity. Wheat, especially 
weevil cargo loses weight from shrinkage and up to 1.2% could be lost in past decades. 
Turpentine has a strong propensity to vaporize. We have seen 5.86 % was evaporated in an 
English case. Cotton will lose moisture and weight due to hot weather. Similar things happen 
to sugar and timber. Bananas are fragile and they are expected to lose 1-4% during carriage as 
an unavoidable result of the handling. Such wastage is also common in the carriage of oil. Oil 
sticks to the side of the oil tanks and pipes and cannot be fully removed, which leaves a 
certain amount of oil remaining on board. Its evaporation and sedimentation can also cause 
shortages upon delivery. Other possible reasons include settling out as water on an ocean 
voyage flaring-off, leakages and so on. All the above contribute to wastage and levels as high 
as 1.19% have been accepted by court. See the World Prestige, [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 60. Of 
course, if the shortage is caused by inefficiency or break down of the vessel's pumps, such a 
loss will not be deducted. 
I 
Dr Wei Fan 
Assistant Vice President 
Marketing Lawyer 
Skuld (Far East) LTD 
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On the other hand, it should not be forgetten that the allegation of short delivery depends 
upon the measurements taken on loading and discharging. It is taken by different people at 
different places (port of loading and discharging) using different measuring equipment. Its 
inaccuracy was clearly shown in The Kriti Rex [1996] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 171 where the number 
of discharged boxes was even more than loaded, a terrible mistake by tallyman at either ports 
or probably both. If the measurement method is inaccurate or unreliable, it is very doubtful 
whether or not there is a loss in the first place. In North Shipping Company Ltd v Joseph 
Rank & Co Ltd, (1926) 26 Ll. L. Rep. 123, the court found that the recipient tallied empty 
cargo bags, and multiplied the weight of one bag to figure out the whole weight after 
discharge. It was highly likely that they had received the cargo but just lost some empty bags, 
which affected the result. There was also doubt cast on the accuracy of the machine and the 
successful and fair selection of the bags to be weighed. Therefore the court denied the claim 
for short delivery. Similarly in the Filiatra Legacy [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 337, there was 4.3% 
shortage of loaded oil based on the shoreside evidence after discharge. Because such an 
evidence was probably imprecise, the court rejected claims for short delivery. In practice for 
the carriage of dry bulk cargo, if the weight is measured by scales at loading and discharge, 
and compared to the same through a draft survey done by the Master, there is bound to be 
significant differences produced. 
 
nder the Hague/Visby Rules Art. IV 2 (m), the carrier will be exempt from liability 
for cargo loss or damage caused by “wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or 
damage arising from inherent defect, quality or vice of the goods”. Generally the 
cargo-owner can raise a prima facie case against the shipowner by showing that there is a 
discrepancy between cargo delivered and marked in the bill of lading. This can be rebutted by 
proving that it was caused by normal transit losses. This argument is particularly potent when 
the missing part is very small and unexplainable, unless the shipper proves otherwise. 
Alternatively, he can argue that the measurement adopted in tallying cargo was inaccurate and 
unreliable, especially when there is no convincing theory of why the cargo is missing. 
However, for any assertion of a serious crime, i.e., cargo was stolen by the shipowner, the 
claimant must give irrefutable evidence. Otherwise the court is more likely to accept the 
theory of wastage from the shipowner‟s side. The above is a likely summary of what would 
happen if the case is heard in English courts.   
 
In accordance with art.51 (exemption of liability) of the Chinese Maritime Code, which is 
entirely based on art. IV (2) of the Hague/Visby Rules, the shipowner should not be liable for 
any damage or loss caused by the “nature or inherent vice of the goods” (Art.51 (9) of the 
CMC) or “…any other causes arising without the fault of the carrier or his servant or agent” 
(Art.51 (12) of the CMC). Its legal position should be the same as under English law. 
However compared with English courts, Chinese courts are less flexible and arguably too 
harsh towards such defence. From a review of Chinese cases, Chinese courts are notably 
persistent in giving 0.5% or less as a benchmark for bulk cargo, fishmeal, Brazil beans or 
soybeans. In Sinochem Guangdong I&E Co Ltd v Asahe Shipping Co Ltd and Others, 
Guangzhou Maritime Court, 29th Dec 2003, (2003) GHFCZ 266, there was about 1.12% 
U 
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short delivery of fuel oil compared with the bill of lading figure. The court held that 0.4% 
was deductible as the “shipping custom”. In Shenzhen Bao‟an Dalong Trading Co v 
Guangzhou Kaida Shipping Co and others, Guangzhou Maritime Court, only 0.3% was held 
deductible for a carriage of rape-seeds. In general, the carrier is more likely to be responsible 
for such a loss in China with less generous allowance than in England.  
 
As a matter of fact, there is no universally accepted standard used to judge reasonableness of 
trade allowance scale. The unfortunate shipowner is exposed to the different views towards 
trade allowance in different jurisdictions. A solution for this? A realistic method to avoid the 
dispute is that both parties should try to make an agreement on the trade allowance figure in 
their contact beforehand; the higher the better for the shipowner. Having said the above, in 
today‟s market, all I can say is that I wish shipowners the best of luck in finding such a nice 
and tolerable charterer.  
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Pearl River Delta 
  
Will the Pearl Shine Again? 
 
Ms Catherine Smith 
Senior Associate 
Holman Fenwick Willan, Hong Kong 
Introduction  
 
In early March 2014, Premier Li Keqiang declared a 
"war on pollution" at the National People's Congress 
(NPC). The level of air pollution in the Pearl River 
Delta (PRD) region has become of increasing concern 
to the Hong Kong SAR and Chinese Central 
Government.   
 
Although carriage of goods by sea is one of the most 
efficient forms of transportation in terms of green house 
gas emissions per tons of cargo carried, in comparison 
to rail, road and air, shipping still accounts for 900 
million tones of greenhouse gas emissions per year 
globally. The PRD is home to two of the four largest 
container ports in the world, Shenzhen and Hong Kong.  
 
According to the Civic Exchange, a not-for-profit think 
tank based in Hong Kong, over the last four years ship 
emissions were Hong Kong's largest source of the 
green house gases sulphur dioxide (SO2), respirable 
particulates (RSP) and nitrogen dioxides.    
 
The cities around the PRD are home to some 50 million 
people. That total is only set to increase. As a result, 
emissions from ocean going vessels as well as smaller 
river vessels have a direct impact on the environment 
and on public health in the region. This poses a challenge for the PRD as it looks to formulate 
a cohesive plan for emissions control from ocean going vessels coming in and out of some of 
the busiest waters in the world.   
 
This article looks at what steps are being taken by the Hong Kong government to reduce 
shipping emissions together with the steps and challenges towards creating a Emission 
Control Area (ECA) for the entire PRD.   
Ms Catherine Smith 
Senior Associate 
Holman Fenwick Willan, Hong 
Kong. She is admitted as a solicitor 
in Hong Kong, England & Wales 
and Scotland.   
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International Regulations and Global Goals  
 
The key International regulations and initiatives aimed at reducing emissions from ocean 
going vessels are as follows:-  
 
(a) Amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships.  ("MARPOL" 73/78");  
(b) Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan ("SEEMP") and Energy Efficiency 
Design Index ("EEDI").  
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) regulates the sulphur content of bunker fuel 
under MARPOL Annex VI "Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships".   
 
There are two sets of bunker fuel quality requirements under Annex VI. These are:-  
 
● Global required bunker quality; and  
●   The existence of Emission Control Area (ECAs). 
 
The current ECAs are in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, North America and the US Caribbean.   
 
Outside the ECAs the current requirement under Regulation 14 of Annex VI is that bunker 
fuel oil must not contain more than 3.5% sulphur oxides (SOx). Inside the ECAs the level is 
1%.   
 
Regulation 13 to Annex VI deals with diesel oil and sets out three allowable levels for 
Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) a vessel may emit by weight depending on the vessel's engine speed 
and depending on the date of construction of the Vessel. At a rpm of more than 2,000 per 
minute the current allowable NOx emission rate is 7.7 grams. The IMO's aim is for this to be 
reduced even further to 2.0 grams by January 2016.   
 
The Hong Kong government gives effect to the MARPOL Annex VI regulations through the 
Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Air Pollution) Regulation. These emissions controls apply 
to vessels with a gross tonnage over 400 GT when in Hong Kong waters and to suppliers of 
bunkers to either a Hong Kong registered vessel or a vessel within Hong Kong waters.  
 
China has also acceded to MARPOL Convention and to Annex VI in particular.   
 
The Voluntary Fair Winds Charter and Hong Kong's Clean Air Plan  
 
In January 2011, some 17 shipping companies voluntarily signed a two year "Fair Winds 
Charter" (the "Charter"). This Charter was promoted by the Hong Kong Shipowners 
Association (HKSOA) and the Hong Kong Liner Shipping Association.   
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Under the Charter, the signatories agree to switch to using 0.5% SOx fuels when berthing in 
Hong Kong. Since coming into effect, the Charter has applied to some 3,600 vessels.  
According to the Civic Exchange, the Charter contributed to the reduction in 890 and 670 
tonnes of sulphur dioxide in 2011 and 2012 respectively.  
 
The Hong Kong Marine Department (MARDEP) responded in September 2012 by launching 
an incentive to encourage more shipowners and operators to burn low SOx fuel when 
berthing in Hong Kong waters. Under MARDEP's scheme, ocean going vessels burning low 
SOx fuel oil receive a 50% discount on port facilities and a discount on light dues of HKD43 
per 100 tons, based on the vessel's tonnage.  
 
omments have been raised in the industry as to whether or not the MARDEP scheme 
is incentivising ship owners and operators enough. This is because the costs savings 
on port facilities and light dues do not cover the additional costs of using more costly 
low sulphur fuels.  Further, some larger shipping companies are concerned that although 
they are paying the additional costs for better quality fuel oil, other ship owners and operators 
are not.   
 
Arthur Bowring, the Managing Director of the HKSOA, has advised that the position of the 
HKSOA has always been that the Fair Winds Charter was put in place to encourage 
Government towards introducing regulation, and then with the understanding that 
Government would first introduce an incentive scheme, followed by regulations applicable to 
all owners and operators, and furthermore would liaise with Guangdong and Shenzhen for 
similar regulations throughout the PRD. 
 
Despite the perceived shortcomings of the MARDEP scheme the Charter has been extended 
voluntarily to the end of 2014.   
 
The Charter was intended to apply until such time as the Hong Kong government introduced 
equivalent legislation. In March 2013 the Hong Kong Environmental Protection Department 
announced its plans to introduce legislation requiring ocean going vessels to burn low SOx 
fuel oil while berthing in Hong Kong waters (i.e. fuel switch at berth). The Environmental 
Protection Department has indicated that draft legislation will be ready for presentation and 
adoption by the Hong Kong Government in July 2014. According to the Government Press 
Release "LCQ15: Marine Emissions of 17 July 2013" this legislation will be implemented in 
2015. It is not yet clear what the penalties will be for non compliance with the new legislation 
and how it will be enforced. However, hopefully this legislation will create the level playing 
field the HKSOA is seeking as well as result in significantly improving the air quality around 
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Regulations Focussed on Quality of Marine Fuel Stemmed at Hong Kong  
 
In January 2014 the Hong Kong government finalized the "Air Pollution Control (Marine 
Light Fuel) Regulations" (the "Regulations") which place controls on the quality of light 
diesel stemmed at Hong Kong. These Regulations will come into force on 1 April 2014.   
 
The Regulations provide that the sulphur content of marine light diesel supplied to vessels in 
Hong Kong (whether Hong Kong flagged vessels or not) must be 0.05% or less and either (1) 
be defined as "Category ISO-F-DMA" in the ISO specifications or (2) be define as "Gasoil 
0.05% Sulfur" in the Platts specifications. The current limit is 0.5%.  
  
The supply of light diesel fuel oil not complying with these sulfur levels is prohibited. Any 
bunker supplier supplying prohibited bunkers is liable on conviction to a fine of between 
HKD25,000 and HKD50,000 and 3 months imprisonment.   
 
The Hong Kong Environmental Protection Department stated that marine vessels operating 
on 0.05% sulphur diesel emit about 90% less SO2 and about 30% less respirable air particles 
than vessels operating on 0.5% sulphur marine diesel. That is a considerable reduction.  
These Regulations aim to reduce SO2 emissions by 19% and respirable particles by 10%.  
  
At present, although the Hong Kong Government has implemented compulsory legislation in 
respect of the sulphur content of bunker fuel supplied in Hong Kong (and therefore likely 
emissions), the Government has not yet implemented legislation to compel ocean going 
vessels coming into Hong Kong to switch fuels to low sulphur fuels when berthing in Hong 
Kong.   
 
Initiatives in other major ports around the PRD  
 
The Chinese State Council issued an "Action Plan on the Prevention and Control of Air 
Pollution" in September 2013. Part of that plan is to improve air quality in the 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Province, the Yangtze River Delta and the PRD. The State Council 
aims to reduce the level of fine particles found in the air in the PRD by 15% over the next 5 
years.   
 
In September 2013 the Shenzhen Government released its "Shenzhen Air Quality 
Enhancement Plan". This plan sets out target for various ship emission control measures.  
The aim is to achieve most of these measures by no later than 2015. The main development 
under the Shenzhen plan is to use shore power in place of vessels generating power by using 
their onboard auxiliary engines and burning fuel in the process. Instead, ships at berth are 
connected to shore electric power, resulting in zero emissions from the vessel in port.  
Shenzhen's plan states that no less than 15 berths in Shenzhen port will be equipped with 
shore power systems by the end of 2015. The Shenzhen Government is also developing an 
incentive scheme to encourage the uptake of shore power and also the burning of low sulphur 
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fuel in port.  
 
In February 2014, the Guangdong Government released its "Guangdong Province Green Port 
Action Plan (2014-2020)". Under that plan the goal is to have the majority of port working 
vessels using shore power at berths by 2020. Shore power will also be used for larger cruise 
ships and at the container terminal for vessels over 100,000 grt. This plan also set out goals 
for the construction of "green" ports in Guangdong, Zhenhai, Shantou, Huizhou, Dongguan 
and Chaozhou.   
 
There has been an upward trend of emissions regulations around the world, notably in France, 
where new reporting requirements have been implemented for CO2 emissions. Under the 
French Transport Code, since 1 October 2013 carriers on voyages to or from a destination in 
France have had to record and notify the CO2 emitted during those voyages.  
 
An ECA for the Pearl River Delta – Dream or Reality?  
 
As set out above there are different schemes for the reduction of emissions from ships being 
applied in Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Guangdong in particular including switching fuel 
initiatives and shore power initiatives.   
 
The "Clean Air Plan for Hong Kong" was published in March 2013 by the Hong Kong 
Environment Bureau in collaboration with the Transport & Housing Bureau, the Food & 
Health Bureau and the Development Bureau. One of the key objectives of that plan is the 
creation of an ECA in the PRD.   
 
The Hong Kong government has began discussions with the relevant authorities around the 
PRD on the feasibility of a fuel switch programme for all the ports of the PRD. Those 
discussions are ongoing.   
 
At the China Maritime 2014 Exp, held in Hong Kong in February 2014, the Undersecretary 
for the Environment, Christine Loh, stated that it was the Hong Kong Government's policy to 
make the PRD an ECA. Ms Loh acknowledged however that "this cannot happen in a short 
time". As an example, the USA and Canadian ECA plan was submitted to the IMO in March 




A coherent marine emission plan is clearly of acute importance for the PRD as home to some 
of the biggest and busiest ports in the world and as home to more than 50 million people.  
The Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Guangdong governments are taking substantial steps to 
reduce ocean going vessel emissions at berths.   
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Given the large geographical area, the number of government departments and agencies 
which need to be consulted and work together, as well as the long process within the IMO, an 
ECA for the PDR is some way off. Local regulations and incentive schemes are already 
showing signs of working. However, varying emissions regulations and bunker quality 
regulations in the region will only serve to add confusion and make compliance by ship 
owners, operators and bunker suppliers in the region more difficult.   
 
Cooperation between the different governments and agencies around the PRD will be 
essential so that the Pearl River Delta can shine again.  
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Is a “Clean” Bill of Lading Clean? 
 
Dr Liang Zhao 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies 
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
 
The bill of lading is an important shipping document in the international trade of goods 
carried by sea. The clean bill of lading states that the goods have been shipped “in 
apparent good order and condition”.  
 
enerally speaking, only clean bills of lading without qualification are accepted for 
trade purpose, e.g. payment of price of good with letter of credit through banks. 
Some bulk cargoes, such as steel and timber, are slightly spoilt by rusting or 
splitting which could be considered as an inherent vice of the goods. In shipping practice, 
such „spoiling‟ is not considered sufficient enough to qualifiy the clean bills of lading. 
Consequently, carriers, normally on the demand of shippers for sales purpose, will issue clean 
bills of lading without clausing them. The well-known clause to this effect is the Retla clause 
(named after the US case, Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co v Retla Steam Ship Co) [1970] 
2 Lloyd's Rep 91). 
 
In Breffka & Hehnke GmbH & Co KG and 
others v Navire Shipping Co. Ltd and others 
(The Saga Explorer) 2012 EWHC 3124; 
[2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep 401, cargo interests 
brought a claim under the bills of lading for 
the damage to a cargo of steel pipes. The 
pipes were in fact heavily rusted on shipment 
to the knowledge of the shipowners, but the 
bills of lading contained a Retla clause, 
based on which the shipowners disclaimed 
the statement with respect to the condition 
of the cargo on the bills. It is the first time 
that the English courts had considered the 
Retla clause which had been popularly 
added to the face of bills of lading when the 
carriage involved iron, steel, metal products 
or timber. Simon J in The Saga Explorer disagreed with the decision of no representation in 
Tokio Marine and held that the statement with the Retla clause made on the bills as to the 
cargo‟s apparent condition was a fraudulent misrepresentation.  
 
In The Saga Explorer, the bills included the usual statement that the goods were “SHIPPED 
in apparent good order and condition . . .” In addition, the bills included a Retla clause as 
follows: 
G 
Dr Liang Zhao 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies 
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
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“IF THE GOODS AS DESCRIBED BY THE MERCHANT ARE IRON, STEEL [OR] 
METAL …, THE PHRASE „APPARENT GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION‟… DOES 
NOT MEAN THE GOODS WERE RECEIVED… FREE OF VISIBLE RUST OR 
MOISTURE… IF THE MERCHANT SO REQUESTS, A SUBSTITUTE BILL OF LADING 
WILL BE ISSUED OMITTING THIS DEFINITION AND SETTING FORTH ANY 
NOTATIONS WHICH MAY APPEAR ON THE MATE‟S OR TALLY CLERK‟S 
RECEIPT.”  
 
In The Saga Explorer, the shipowners, knowing the damaged condition of the goods on 
shipment, did not clause the bills of lading. Instead, at the shippers‟ request, they issued the 
bills containing the Retla clause against a letter of indemnity from the shippers. One of the 
questions in this case is whether the bills of lading contained a fraudulent representation as to 
the condition of the goods on shipment. 
 
The authority to the question is Canada and Dominion Sugar Co Ltd v Canadian National 
Steamships (West Indies) Ltd (1946) 80 Ll L Rep 13 (PC). This case involved the shipment of 
a cargo of sugar. Bills of lading were issued by the shipowners stating that sugar had been 
received in apparent good order and condition. They also entered a marginal endorsement 
“signed under guarantee to produce ship‟s clean receipt”. In fact, the sugar had been damaged 
before loading and the mate‟s receipt eventually recorded that many bags were stained, torn 
and re-sewn. The sugar was found to be damaged and the assignee of the bills brought an 
action against the shipowners arguing estoppel. The crucial question was the true construction 
of the bill of lading in regard to the statement as to the condition of the cargo. Because the 
statement was qualified, in the opinion of their Lordships, the estoppel which could have 
been set up by the assignees as against the shipowners could not be relied on.  
 
rom the endorsement “signed under guarantee to produce ship‟s clean receipt”, it could be 
reasonable to infer that the mate‟s receipt had not reached the shipowners when they signed 
the bills. In Canada and Dominion, evidence was given and not questioned that there was a 
practice at the port to issue bills of lading before the completion of the loading and the issue 
of the mate‟s receipt in order to facilitate the shipper‟s business arrangements, i.e. the bills 
could be presented to the buyer for acceptance of an payment before the carrying vessel‟s 
arrival ((1946) 80 Ll L Rep 13 (PC), 16). That could be the reason why the ship-owners 
issued a “received”, not “shipped”, bill of lading with such a qualification to the condition of 
the cargo. Therefore, the Privy Council held that there was no ground for holding the 
shipowners guilty of any breach of conduct or duty in regard to the carriage of the goods 
((1946) 80 Ll L Rep 13 (PC), 18). 
 
If the shipowners in Canada and Dominion were not guilty because they did not know the 
damaged condition of the goods when the “received” bill of lading was issued, the 
shipowners in Tokio Marine might be guilty because they knew the damaged condition of the 
goods when they issued clean bills of lading which did not state the damaged condition. The 
F 
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latter case involved the shipment of a cargo of galvanised and ungalvanised pipes. Despite the 
fact that heavy rust and wetness was noted on the tally sheets and the mate‟s receipt, the bills 
of lading stated that the goods were shipped on board “in apparent good order and condition”. 
A rust clause (i.e. the Retla clause) in the lower portion of the bills recited that “term 
„apparent good order and condition‟… does not mean that the goods, when received, were 
free of visible rust or moisture”, and provided for a substitute bill if that information is 
requested. In the opinion of the US judges (in District Court and Court of Appeals), the 
decisive point was not the conduct of the shipowners, but the construction of the bills of 
lading. The judges followed Canada and Dominion and took the view that there was no 
representation as to the condition of the cargo. As the shipper had not requested the issue of a 
substitute bill, the US courts held that the bills of lading issued and qualified could not form 
the basis for an estoppel ([1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep 91, 96).  
 
In The Saga Explorer, although the mate‟s receipts contained a reservation that the cargo was 
received in the damaged condition, the bills of lading contained no such reservation because 
the shippers requested that the bills of lading be issued unclaused against letters of indemnity. 
The shipowners denied liability for the damage and contended that there was no 
misrepresentation as to the apparent order and condition of the goods in the bills of lading. 
This argument was rejected by Simon J. He pointed out that the issue of the clean bills in this 
case was not an honest conduct of the Master. In his view, before issuing bills of lading the 
Master “must form an honest and reasonable, non-expert view of the cargo as he sees it and, 
in particular, as to its apparent order and condition” ([2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep 401, at [32]). 
Because the appearance and condition of the cargo was not reasonably and honestly 
represented by the bills of lading, Simon J held that the statement as to the apparent order and 
condition of the goods on those bills of lading involved false representations by the owners 
(([2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep 401, at [55]).). 
 
In order to emphasize the importance of honesty, Simon J cited Standard Chartered Bank v 
Pakistan National Shipping Corporation ([1995] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 365 (No. 1); [1998] 1 Lloyd‟s 
Rep 684 (No. 2)) in which Clarke J and Cresswell J described that “Honest commerce 
requires that those who put important documents, like bills of lading, into circulation do so 
only where the bill of lading, as far as they know, represents the true facts.” ([1995] 2 Lloyd‟s 
Rep 365, 374 and [1998] 1 Lloyd‟s Rep 684, 704, respectively) However, representing “the 
true facts” does not mean the representation of all facts. Parties to the bill of lading, including 
the carrier, are free to provide a disclaimer in their contract unless otherwise prohibited by 
law. In fact, no such a law applied in Tokio Marine and The Saga Explorer, and there is no 
reason to request that the shipowners represent all the true facts. If they represented with a 
disclaimer, e.g. the Retla clause, it means that they in essence represented nothing. 
 
It may be argued that the shipowners were not honest businessman because they knew the 
damaged condition and they could but did not represent the truth. In Canada and Dominion, 
the shipowners did not issue a “shipped” bill of lading to replace the “received” bill in order 
to state the damaged condition of the cargo even they knew the damaged condition later. 
  
21 | P a g e  
 
Maritime Law & Insurance                                          MARITIME INSIGHT 
 
Is a “Clean” Bill of Lading Clean                                     Volume 2, Issue 1, Spring 2014 
 
Could it be said to be dishonest conduct or performance of carriage? Simon J answered in the 
affirmative. The answer, however, is not under the Hague Rules. Article III r. 7 provides that 
the carrier may issue a “shipped” bill of lading “if the shipper so demands”. If there is no 
such demand, why should the shipowners issue a clean bill of lading?  In relation to English 
law, the Privy Council in Vita Food Products, Inc. v Unus Shipping Company held that “there 
is indeed no law which prevents goods being carried at sea without any bill of lading at all” 
([1939] AC 277, 294). Simon J‟s request of honest conduct might be a requirement of good 
faith in business. However, it should be noted that good faith has been applied in very limited 
fashion to business in English common law. 
 
In English law it is clear by now, by virtue of the decision of The Saga Explorer, that the 
inclusion of a RETLA clause will only protect an owner in cases of merely superficial rust or 
moisture. It seems to be a cargo-friendly decision. However, because the shippers always 
request the clean bill of lading for trade purpose and never call for a substitute bill of lading 
showing the true condition of goods, shipowners will inevitably continue to clause bill of 
lading if they have no other better way of protecting themselves in the situation of Tokio 
Marine or The Saga 
Explorer. A letter of 
indemnity may provide 
illusory protection for a 
shipowner who 
deliberately issues a 
clean bill of lading 
when he knows the 
defects of condition 
because the indemnity 
was held to be illegal 
and void on the grounds 
of fraud. For the present, 
the decision of 
misrepresentation in 
The Saga Explorer 
might mean it is 
impossible to change 
the position of the 
assignees of the bill of 
lading.                                                         
                   
 
 Photography by Fang Zhang, 2013 
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Summary of the Legal and Policy 
Framework Relating to Vessel-source 
Pollution in Hong Kong 
 
Dr Ling Zhu 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies 
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
 
ong Kong suffers from the typical marine pollution problems associated with 
shipping activities. In 2012, for example, 136 oil pollution incidents were 
reported,
1
and the port collected 4,351 tons of refuse from vessels.
2
In addition to 
this, the busy schedule of vessels in Hong Kong and nearby regions “amounts to a recipe for 
a rich lethal potion of SO2, PM and NOx”.3To meet the ever-increasing challenges, Hong 
Kong has formulated a legal and policy framework to prevent and rectify vessel-source 
pollution.  
 
Under the policy of “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong does not have a so-called 
constitutional law. However, its constitutional legal framework is embodied in the Basic 
Law.
4
 Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy, except for 
specific issues relating to defense and foreign affairs.
5
 Such sphere of autonomy is reflected 
in its marine environment protection, including its environmental lawmaking.
6
 This 
empowers Hong Kong as an independent party in international environmental agreements, 
including the marine environment.
7As a result of the UK‟s historic influence, Hong Kong has 
been subject to most of the relevant international conventions, and Hong Kong‟s obligations 
under the majority of these international treaties and conventions did not change after its 
return to China.
8
Hong Kong is a party to almost all the marine pollution conventions, and its 
vessel-source pollution laws are primarily an implementation of the relevant conventions. 
One important aspect of the international obligations undertaken by Hong Kong concerning 
protection of the marine environment is its implementation of these laws at the domestic level. 
This has been done through appropriate legislative measures by putting in place various 
provisions of particular international conventions that regulate and protect the marine 
environment from vessel-source pollution. These domestic laws provide the legal basis for 
                                                        
1






Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law, Preamble. 
5
 Annex III of the Basic Law. 
6
 BL Liebman,„Autonomy Through Separation? Environmental Law and the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong‟,Harvard International Law Journal 39 (1998) p.234. 
7
 R Mushkat,„International Environmental Law: How Green Is the Future?‟ in The New Legal Order in Hong 
Kong, R Wacks (ed) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), p.631. 
8
Article 8 of the Basic Law. 
H 
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various measures taken by Hong Kong authorities in tackling vessel-source pollution.  
 
t an administrative level, the Environmental Protection Department under the 
Environment Bureau is responsible for developing policies covering environmental 
protection, enforcing environmental legislation and handling pollution complaints 
and incidents. The Hong Kong Marine Department is the port authority empowered by the 
Shipping and Port Ordinance.
9
This department is responsible for ensuring compliance with 
international and local safety and marine environmental protection standards in respect of 
ships registered and licensed in Hong Kong and using Hong Kong waters.
10
Hong Kong takes 
effective measures to fulfill its obligations associated with vessel-source pollution as a flag 
and port state. As of December 2013, 2,327 ships having a gross tonnage of 86.43 million 
were registered in Hong Kong, and this number has continued to grow since the beginning of 
2014.
11
 The Marine Department ensures that all ships flying the Hong Kong flag comply 
with vessel-source pollution regulations. All Hong Kong-registered ocean-going ships and 
locally licensed vessels are required to be surveyed and certified according to pollution 
prevention regulations.
12
In particular, for the control of oil pollution, Hong Kong ships are 
required to carry a Hong Kong Oil Pollution Prevention (HKOPP) Certificate for internal 
water voyages, and an International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) Certificate or HKOPP 
Certificate for international voyages.
13
To exercise the port‟s jurisdiction, the Hong Kong 
Marine Department is authorized to ensure that non-Hong Kong registered ships also comply 
with requirements under international conventions whilst in Hong Kong waters. The Marine 
Department will therefore carry out Port State Control (PSC) inspections according to IMO 
Resolution A. 1052(27)
14
 and the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control Manual. Under such PSC inspection, the officers will assess whether the ship and/or 
crew is able to prevent pollution of the environment throughout its forthcoming voyage.
15
For 
example, one area of specific inspection campaigns involves checking the “oil record book”16 
and those oil tankers “older than 15 years” so as to control vessel source pollution as required 
under MARPOL conventions.
17
Serious violation may lead to detention or notice of 
                                                        
9
 The Laws of Hong Kong, Cap 313. 
10
The Marine Department, Organisation, Functions and Services, available at 
http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/aboutus/dept.html (last accessed on 12 March 2014). 
11
Statistics, Number and Gross Tonnage of Ships Registered in Hong Kong, available at 
http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/pub_services/pdf/mon_stat.pdf (last accessed on 11 March 2014). 
12Advisory Council on the Environment, „Control of Ship-sourced Pollution within Hong Kong Waters‟, ACE 




Procedures for Port State Control, adopted in 2011, available at 
https://www.dpc.mar.mil.br/sta/proc_psc.pdf(last accessed on 11 March 2013). 
15
Ibid. 
16Advisory Council on the Environment, „Control of Ship-sourced Pollution within Hong Kong Waters‟, ACE 
Paper 30/2008, p.4. 
17
 Port State Control: A guide for ships involved in the dry bulk trades, p.15. 
A 
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In addition, there have been some new advances made. The Marine Department, for example, 
launched Smoke Emission Control to monitor smoke emission from vessels, as well as 
making random inspections for Dangerous Goods Control on vessels conveying dangerous 
goods in Hong Kong waters.
19
In order to be prepared for oil spills and be able to tackle oil 
pollution incidents, the Marine Department has developed an effective Maritime Oil Spill 
Response Plan that co-ordinates both public and private resources. Regular drill exercises and 
staff training are provided under this Plan.
20
Although the HNS convention is not yet in force, 
Hong Kong joined the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation to Pollution 
Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (“HNS”) in 2013 for collaboration and 




fficiency, safety and sustainability should be the three main objectives that Hong 
Kong has in order to maintain and improve its competitive position among 
international ports. Various legal and policy methods are continuously being adopted 
in Hong Kong to protect its marine environment and prevent it suffering from vessel-source 
pollution. However, with the integration of its infrastructure and increase in activities in the 
Pearl River Delta region, Hong Kong‟s marine environment is being challenged. This 
presents both opportunities and challenges for updating the legal and policy framework so as 
to combat vessel-source pollution in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government has actively 
adopted various measures in response to issues affecting marine pollution in the Pearl River 
Delta region. For instance, in response to oil spills within Hong Kong waters, the Hong Kong 
Marine Department now has a regional co-operation guide
22
 shared with its counterpart 
administrations in Guangdong, Shenzhen and Macao. Regarding vessel-source air pollution, 
„A Clean Air Plan for Hong Kong‟23 was published in March 2013, in which the government 
promises that before 2017 or 2018 ships will use low-sulphur diesel while berthing, instead of 
burning high sulphur bunker fuel,
24
and as mentioned by the chief executive of Hong Kong in 





                                                        
18
Advisory Council on the Environment, „Control of Ship-sourced Pollution within Hong Kong Waters‟, ACE 
Paper 30/2008, p.3. 
19




Government of Hong Kong, Press Release 2013, available at    
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201301/10/P201301100325.htm, 29(last accessed on 11 March 2014). 
22
Regional Maritime Oil Spill from Ship Response Plan for the Pearl River Estuary. 
23
 Environment Bureau, Transport & Housing Bureau, Food & Health Bureau and Development Bureau, A 
Clean Air Plan for Hong Kong, available at http://www.enb.gov.hk/en/files/New_Air_Plan_en.pdf (last accessed 
on 12 March 2014). 
24
 The Port of Hong Kong Handbook & Directory 2013, p.54. 
25 
Policy Address 2014, available at http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2014/eng/index.html, 159 (last accessed 
on11 March 2014). 
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Insurances for a Charterer or Operator 
 
Captain Pappu Sastry 
Director, Founder and Managing Partner  
NEPA Projects, Hong Kong 
 
Enough has been spoken about the marine insurances related to ships but we don’t always 
realize that we are talking of Insurances from the point of view of an Owner and not from 
the perspective of Charterers/ Operators or Traders/Shippers. These are an important link 
in the shipping chain whether it is dry bulk cargo, containers or tankers. Let us collectively 
call them Charterers for the sake of this article.  
 
his article is a practical approach to the design of coverage for all major insurances 
that cover the risks for Charterers in their 
business; the intention is not to educate the 
readers on the intricacies of insurance covers but to give 
a Charterers perspective on the design of coverage. So, 
all my friends in the Marine Insurance industry should 
pardon me for possibly over simplifying the subject. 
  
To start with, Charterers are a very varied and 
fragmented fraternity; we can always see Shipowners 
associations but less so for such Charterers associations. 
There is always a concern in Owners mind that the 
Charterers are not credible if they do not have sufficient 
cover for eventualities; "sufficient" being the key word 
there. Almost everyone considers that IGA club P&I 
covers (or a few fixed premium insurance covers) are 
sufficient to prove that the Charterers have a cover for 
'any' eventualities. Sadly, this misconception leads to 
the predictable truth that Charterers sometimes have so 
much risk on themselves that they are almost always 
under-insured. They may have a good cover for 
Charterers liabilities but may not have a cover for costs. 
Irrespective of this, barring a few, Charterers 
themselves really do not appreciate the risk or the need 








Captain Pappu Sastry 
Director, Founder and Managing 
Partner 
NEPA Projects, Hong Kong 
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Main insurances for any Charterer are broadly divided as follows: 
  
 Charterers Liability (P&I) 
 
Very simply, P&I is to cover liabilities - any situation where Charterers have to make 
additional payments to some party during the Charter period whether under contract or 
otherwise. There are many types of claims possible under the cover, with common claims 
being: Cargo shortages, cargo damages, damages to the ship due to cargo work or cargo 
operations including ship-to-ship transfers, customs fines, bunker quality related claims, 
contribution to General Average portion of Bunker Ownership, as well as several other 
examples. Under each header the claims can range from minor to major. Unlike P&I for 
Ship-owners, where there is a fixed rate per GT for the whole year for a specific ship, the 
Charterers business entails different types, age, and size of ships for their business and there 
are changes every time a ship is chartered even if for a single trip on voyage or time charter. 
Charterers cover would have premiums based on GT ranges for the specific trades or 
commodities that the Charterers are generally involved in. Bunkers are the property of the 
Charterers in most time charter parties and most P&I clubs will cover bunkers liability at no 
additional cost but normally under a different header; it is also possible to have a separate 
bunker insurance cover.  
 
P&I for Charterers is almost always a fixed premium per GT per ship's voyage duration (per 
annum pro_rata); in recent times P&I insurers have also been innovative enough to fix a 
premium per MT of cargo carried if they are covering a risk that relates to a contract of 
affreightment or traders who move same commodity under the cover. Fixed premium also 
means that the upper limit of the cover is important. Charterers liability market is 
predominantly a fixed premium market whether with IGA or with the many reliable fixed 
premium insurers available for underwriting the risk. Whilst the IGA clubs are able to afford 
USD 500 million - USD 1 billion coverage, fixed premium clubs will be able to provide up to 
such limits as USD 500 million but have the option of lesser premium for small upper limits 
at as low as USD 5 million.  
 
 Freight Defense and Demurrage (FDD) 
 
For the sake of new entrants into the industry, FDD is an insurance that covers legal and 
survey costs when there are disputes related to the Charter Party (CP) or the Bill of Lading 
(BL). It is surprising always to note that P&I is given so much importance that FDD's role is 
undermined. FDD is possibly the most useful tool also to avoid having disputes under the CP 
or BL - because all FDD insurers provide legal advice and a quick opinion on whether you 
are correct in assuming what you assume when a Owner alleges a Charterer of supplying 
incorrect bunkers or when there is a Speed & Consumption claim under Time Charter. Most 
common types of claims faced are the huge demurrage disputes, speed & consumption claims, 
and legal costs incurred for either fighting a sub charterer who has not paid freight or an 
Owner who will not return overpaid hire. FDD does not pay the money that the other party 
may owe you but will pay the costs involved in recovering the money from the other party.  
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 Bunkers & Freight insurance (Freight) 
 
The Charterers main asset in a Time Charter is the bunkers onboard the ship which the 
Charterers pay for when they take delivery from Owners; whilst the only income in a charter 
is the freight which is normally (deemed) earned upon completion of loading (different trades 
have different norms). That is the reason we can consider both of them in unison. The 
bunkers onboard can be covered under P&I or otherwise. Freight insurance is to prevent the 
eventuality of losing the ship or cargo before freight is deemed earned. To illustrate the 
importance of such a cover, consider this scenario: Time charterers take delivery of a Handy 
dry bulk cargo ship from North China for USD 8,000 per day hire and pays 15 days charter 
hire in advance along with USD 300,000 for bunkers on delivery and order ship to ballast 
towards Busan for bunkering worth USD 500,000 and then ballast across Pacific for a 
standard NOPAC R/V (North Pacific Round Voyage). The Vessel then encounters bad 
weather after passing Alaska and sinks a few days before reaching Vancouver, when vessel 
was already on hire for 15 days. Charterers just lost their bunkers and hire without earning 
estimated freight of USD 1,500,000. Imagine these numbers with a Cape size ballasting from 
China to Australia or a VLCC ballasting all the way from Rotterdam back to Arabian Gulf.  
 
 Loss of Hire (LOH) 
 
One of the foremost topics of discussion nowadays is piracy mainly when transiting Indian 
Ocean and related costs to Charterers and their liabilities. Most of the Time Charter Parties 
will allow for clauses related to costs apportionment under the Piracy Clause. Whilst most 
Owners adopt the BIMCO Piracy clause, there are various costs (SEC D) that are 
commercially dealt with during negotiations wherein the Owners may prefer to have a lump 
sum from Charterers to cover extra war risk insurances, K&R (Kidnap and Ransom) 
premiums, costs of security equipment, crew bonus and possibly also armed guards. Whilst 
many Owners will consider having their own K&R insurance, they will want the BIMCO 
Piracy clause intact related to Charter hire payments (SEC F) if the ship is hijacked. 
Charterers can and should take their own insurances for standalone LOH even though 
Owners may have LOH cover because Owners cover is not for the sake of covering 
Charterers liability under SEC F of the Piracy Clause.  
 
Open covers for LOH are available from a select few niche insurers who specialize in K&R 
and LOH sectors. None of the P&I and H&M (Hull & Machinery) insurances of Owners or 
Charterers include this insurance automatically. Cover is generally per transit, and can be 
extended to areas such as West Africa as well. Cover has evolved over the last few years to 
attach vessels to this insurance from port to port notwithstanding the period of transit or 
whether the vessel is in a designated 'High Risk Area' when hijacked.  
 
A common misconception is that Charterers liability is restricted to 90 days of Charter hire 
under this piracy clause, although Charterers still stand to lose the bunkers value after the 
91st day until the vessel is released; standalone LOH can include this only by specific 
arrangements. 
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 Strike & Delay (Strike) 
 
Possibly offered by only 1-2 insurers world-wide, this is practically the most useful insurance 
for Charterers regular operations for delays due to scenarios that are beyond Charterer's 
operational control. Such cover is available as a mutual insurance for Owners and for 
Charterers. Charterers part of the insurance covers time lost due to any incident onshore such 
as strikes by port workers, mechanical breakdown of onshore equipment (such as a shore 
crane), and the closure or physical obstruction of a port or waterway. The insurance also 
covers time lost/ delays due to congestion as a result of such onshore incidents, even after the 
incident onshore has ended. Common claim situations include strikes, industrial disputes, fire 
or mechanical breakdown on land, port closures due to obstructions, stowaways or saving life 
at sea, and quarantine among other scenarios. Insurance normally has a 1 day deductible and 
9 days of cover which is both useful and characteristic of the incidents that this insurance 
covers. 
 
 Ship-owners Liability (SOL) 
  
Actual practice is something that differs from typical handbook theory. SOL cover is possibly 
the bridge between when Charterers sometime have to agree to some documentation or some 
carriage procedures that are not normally covered by P&I. The best example of the reality vs 
cover is possibly the LOI (Letter of Indemnity) which is the document demanded from 
shippers by Charterers and from Charterers by Owners for doing anything out of the norm 
including releasing cargo without the Original Bill of Lading or at a different discharge port 
than what is mentioned in the Bill of Lading. Whilst P&I clubs also provide standard formats 
for such LOIs, they will not cover the situations that will arise from it.  
 
In various trades, the Charterers are at times pushed to agree to terms that are not covered, 
normally for commercial reasons. It is increasingly common for Charterers to be named as 
carriers on Bill of Lading rather than Owners; it is also becoming common for Charterers to 
absolve Owners from shortage claims when calling at a few ports that are 'notorious' for 
claims. During the practical course of business, Charterers encounter various such scenarios 
for which they can get coverage on a case-by-case basis or as an open cover. 
 
 Other Insurances 
 
There are several insurances that can be procured and are both major and necessary in their 
own way. War risk insurances that Owners would take coverage for are normally not 
sufficient to cover the risks of the Charterers under an actual war risk (or disturbance such as 
the current Ukraine-Russia situation or the Middle East crisis not so long ago). Cargo 
insurances for traders could well be a point of contention if traders do not cover for all risks 
when cargo is on a ship or if they will have multi-handling or multi-transportation over water 
which may not be covered unless specifically agreed.  
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Many insurance brokers are able to handle most of these insurances all under one roof. 
However, as mentioned earlier, Charterers are a varied lot and each one is peculiar in their 
operations and need for various insurances. Charterers, Operators and Shippers are surely the 
least regulated essential link of Shipping in various sectors. Whilst tanker Charterers and 
even terminals have imposed several regulations upon themselves, there are many dry cargo 
(Bulk, Break Bulk, General cargo, Containers, Heavy lift etc) Charterers who are still far 
from any kind of possible regulation.  
 
That said, there is a distinct difference between managing all risks and over insuring yourself 
without regard to commercial aspects. Therefore, it becomes the self-imposed discipline of 
the Charterers not only to convince the Ship Owners that they are sufficiently covered for any 
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The Policy Paradox of Container Security 
 
Special Report of Laboratory of Container Security 





ccording to Michael McNicholas, the author of „Maritime Security‟ 
(Butterworth-Heinemann Homeland Security) “misdeclaration of cargo in manifests 
filed by carriers with respective Customs continues to be a very worrisome ongoing 
problem, that increasingly offers an illegitimate back door to all kinds of nefarious characters 
to transport all manner of illegal/illicit cargoes with disastrous consequences for importing 
countries”. The International Maritime Organization‟s (IMO) cargo committee has also noted 
that they inspect approximately 15,000 containers every year and regularly find a substantial 
percentage of containers with misdeclared contents. Similarly the US Customs have stated 
that after conducting a yearlong audit of containers in seven countries (Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, Italy, South Korea, Sweden and US) they found 32% of containers with misdeclared 
cargoes. This is a particularly distressing situation if we take into consideration the fact that 
less than 6% of containers are inspected by customs on arrival.  
 
A majority of the global supply chains today are to a great extent dependant on marine 
containers. These containers are of particular concern as they originate at many different 
locations and are transported through complex logistics networks before reaching their final 
destination. In addition, the transportation process involves many different participants and 
many points of transfer. As the procedure for stuffing/de-stuffing of containers is more or less 
the same in most countries of the world, broad inferences that are drawn here for one country 
could easily be applicable to others too (RMG, 2004). It should also be recognized ab-initio 
that the Customs do not and will not assume any responsibility for the failure of container 
security. On the contrary, in order to prevent loss of Customs revenue during the land and sea 
transit, liability for the same is passed on to the Custodian who furnishes a bond guarantee 
(which is quite different from a bank guarantee) for a specific amount equivalent to the value 
of the Customs revenue which is at risk.  
 
Several studies of maritime security conducted by numerous scholars have concluded that 
the movement of oceangoing cargo in containers is at all times during transit vulnerable to 
either natural or some man-made risks. As a result, vulnerabilities exist that criminals can 
and do take advantage of, by exploiting the containers for transporting illegal cargoes and 
illicit substances. There have been several cases detected in different parts of the world 
where even live explosives were transported in a container without the knowledge of either 
the Customs or the Custodian (Eriksson, 2001).  
A 
       
31 | P a g e  
 
Special Report                                                   MARITIME INSIGHT 
 
The Policy Paradox of Container Security                              Volume 2, Issue 1, Spring 2014 
 
 
he misdeclaration of the cargo in a manifest given by the shipping line to customs, i.e. 
the mismatch between the cargo in containers and its description in the manifest can 
be due to two probable causes, what we may term as a non-invasive mismatch and an 
invasive mismatch. Non-invasive mismatch may be due to an inadvertent error in packing, 
stuffing and reporting or may be deliberate false declaration of the contents by the consignor. 
It could be an attempt to wrongfully avoid customs duty or smuggle prohibited goods. On the 
other hand, the invasive mismatch is most likely to be a result of theft from a container or 
criminal trespass of a container where someone switches the cargo in a container, often with 
the cargo having the same weight so as to evade detection by weighing and by cursory 
examination.  
 
Invariably Customs at the destination assume that if a container has arrived with the door 
handle seal intact, then the cargo inside the container has not been tampered with, despite 
considerable empirical evidence being available which substantiates that container doors can 
be quite easily unhinged and replaced without cutting the door seals. Nonetheless, unless 
there is prima facie evidence of theft en route, made obvious by a broken seal, locks or other 
manifest damage to the container, the mismatch of cargo from the consignor/shipping line‟s 
manifest, is not considered by the Customs as an incident worthy of reporting to any law 
enforcing agencies.  
 
This said, one cannot ignore the fact of non-invasive mismatch, which while fairly common 
can only be detected by Customs after the opening of the container. After that it is left to the 
discretion of the local Customs Collector to decide what follow up action needs to be taken 
such as levying penalties, allowing amendment of the manifest or confiscation of cargoes. In 
most countries, the consignee/carrier is given an opportunity of amending the manifest by 
filing an amended „Bill of Entry‟ to conform the cargo to the declaration and pay the 
additional duties/penalties if any.  
 
Technically, as per the law, misdeclaration is an offence. The onus of correct declaration is on 
the agency that is making the declaration, i.e. the shipping line that is landing the containers. 
It is clear that in most cases the shipping lines are not accorded an opportunity to examine the 
cargo that has been entrusted to them. As such, the shipping lines have no option but to trust 
the information stated in the forwarding note given to them by the consignor. Several Courts 
have upheld the shipping line‟s viewpoint that they indeed cannot, despite their best efforts, 
examine the contents of the container and match it with the information stated in the 
forwarding note as the same has been sealed by Customs and therefore they should not be 
held liable for mismatch if any between the cargo in containers and its description in the 
manifest. However all the judgments have strongly emphasized that the shipping lines should 
make all possible efforts to verify the information provided by the consignor before using it 
as a defense to avoid liability. 
 
During our research, we observed that the application of the liability principle varied in 
different countries. In some countries, the shipping lines are held responsible, while in others, 
T 
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the consignee is held responsible. As one customs officer explained, “We consider the 
beneficiary of the misdeclaration to be responsible for the same. As the consignee is the 
beneficiary in most cases he is held responsible by Customs”. This is despite the argument 
put forward by the consignee that they never imported the offending cargo that arrived in the 
container in the first place and the consignors or the carrier should be held responsible for it. 
This argument of the consignees has also been upheld by the courts in various legal disputes. 
Having said that, a majority of such consignees prefer to plead guilty and pay the penalty 
rather than get into a long drawn litigation with Customs.  
 
However the Customs are unable to make any headway where the consignees do not come 
forward to clear their cargo, especially the cargo that is not legally allowed to be imported, 
such as explosives, hazardous goods or medical waste. There are a large number of such 
uncleared containers lying at various locations, particularly in developing countries like India. 
These were landed there under false declaration and when the authorities detected the fraud, 
the country of origin refused to accept them. Even the carriers have abandoned those 
containers. In most circumstances the consignor manages to escape liability as he is beyond 
the jurisdiction of the Customs officials of importing countries. As regards to whether the 
consignor should be held responsible, if at all, will be left to the jurisprudence of the courts to 
verify the intention of the consignor- termed as mens rea in legal parlance - who may or may 
not have known as to what precisely was packed in the container.  
 
During our research we also noticed that the percentage of containers reported to be found 
with misdeclared contents due to either invasive or noninvasive mismatches was quite 
insignificant. The near zero reporting of incidents of cargo thefts and cargo mismatch led us 
to deeper investigation which confirmed our suspicion that the instances of misdeclaration, 
even when they take place, are seldom recorded. 
 
It is a widely recognized and accepted fact that most of the thefts occur during the inland 
transportation or the warehousing stage of the supply chain. However as the incidents of 
invasive mismatch of containers at inland warehouses is insignificant, it could be concluded 
that container security in warehouses is quite satisfactory. While the credit for safe arrival of 
containers goes to the inland transport haulers, the onus of security at the destination is that of 
the warehouse operator or his duly appointed security agent. Thus the question arises as to 
what extent can the prima-facie improvement in the security environment be attributed to the 
security agency and could the practices be replicated elsewhere with similar results?  
 
Present day global supply chains reply extensively upon outsourcing of various activities for 
a variety of reasons, such as cost reduction, avoidance of liability or for availing of 
specialized expertise.  However some activities are not usually outsourced due to being 
prohibited by law (policing and judicial functions). Despite this, security management of 
ports, airports, dry ports and similar establishments is entrusted to the „custodian‟ of such 
facilities by Customs. It is also not uncommon to notice that almost all such custodians 
further outsource the security functions to either auxiliary police/army forces or to private 
security agencies.  This could have been considered fair and reasonable if such security 
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agencies possessed specialized expertise and knowledge and were also permitted to exercise 
adequate discretion and judgment of their own in discharging their duties.  
 
Our research also revealed that the security agencies in numerous cases possessed neither any 
special expertise nor knowledge. The sole objective of the outsourcing exercise appeared to 
be simply reduction of labor costs and not enhancement of security environment. It should 
also be emphasized here that outsourcing of security functions, does not, in any way, reduce 
the primary responsibility of the custodian with regards to security. Complicating the matters 
further are the legal regimes governing the powers, responsibilities and liabilities of the 
security firms, which are fairly ambiguous in most countries. As such these lacunae will have 
to be addressed sooner rather than later.  
 
Furthermore it also came to our notice that the warehouse operator did not actually outsource 
the security function, even while engaging security agency, as he continues to retain the 
power to supervise the security agency personnel. The warehouse operators were found to 
exercise, in almost all instances, their own discretion with regards to the number of security 
personnel deemed necessary for providing adequate security and then subsequently went on 
to instruct the security agency to provide the necessary personnel at the cheapest cost. The 
warehouse operator then went ahead to instruct the agency personnel to perform certain 
security related tasks such as manning the gates, warehouses and perimeter walls, and also 
supervises their performance. In this manner the security agency gets converted into a mere 
labor supply agency. As such the security agency did not in any way enhance the security 
environment. 
 
Hence the question that begs to be answered is whether it is necessary to outsource security 
functions in the first place. What purpose does this exercise of outsourcing really serve? 
 
Securing the Supply Chain 
 
All the stakeholders involved in the global trade have comprehensively recognized the fact 
that it is difficult and practically impossible, due to time and cost constraints, to open and 
examine all containers in transit, as proposed by the United States. This is despite the widely 
acknowledged fact that on numerous occasions the cargo packed inside the container does 
not match the description of that mentioned in the manifests. At the moment the only 
alternative to avoid opening all containers, at least on the face of it, appears to be the usage 
of non-intrusive scanners or similar devices to inspect the containers externally.  
 
However several questions remain to be answered. Should the scanning process be 
conducted by Customs themselves or can it be outsourced to the Custodian/Security Agency? 
Who should own and operate the scanners and what action, if any, should be initiated after a 
mismatch between the details mentioned in the cargo manifest and actual cargo found in the 
container is noticed? Can this function be outsourced to the private security agencies without 
compromising national interests? Should the security agency conducting the examination 
take any cognizance of cargo that is not a security threat, but has not been mentioned in the 
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cargo manifest? What kind of liability or guarantees would be required from private 
scanning agencies? Will they not need to be further empowered? 
 
It would not be entirely inappropriate here to highlight the specific „security‟ concerns of the 
Custodian. First and foremost (as stated earlier), the Custodian has a legal obligation to 
provide „security‟ in the Port/ Dry Port as a condition for becoming the Custodian. However 
Customs has neither precisely defined the security requirements that the Custodian has to 
ensure, nor has it stated any specific acts that would be monitored by the local in-charge of 
Customs to determine the adequacy or otherwise of the security. In turn, the Custodian also 
outsources the security functions to private security agencies without stating their duties and 
liabilities in detail. The concerned security agency is simply “required to provide round the 
clock security at the entire Port/Dry Port complex and exercise the greatest possible care and 
take adequate preventive measures against theft, fire, sabotage, pilferage or damages of 
Custodian‟s property including material, cargo and machinery”. The agency is also threatened 
that any theft, pilferage or damages to cargo, property or machinery, equipment entrusted to 
the Custodian or within the Custodian‟s premises shall be charged to the agency, if it is 
proved that it was caused due to negligence of the security personnel. 
 
Job specification of this nature raises several issues with regards to the definition of the 
greatest possible care and what is meant by adequate preventive measures. A closer reading 
of the security contract in question indicates that the contract is de facto a contract of 
supplying manpower to the Custodian. The Custodian then deploys the manpower according 
to his own risk perception for conducting certain acts such as regulating entry/exit of cargo 
and personnel by manning the entry/exit gates and checking gate-passes of vehicles exiting 
the facility. The security agency is not assigned any discretion in matters of security, for 
instance in deciding whether CCTVs need to be provided, whether it can deploy agents to 
gather intelligence, examine a few vehicles intensively instead of examining each vehicle and 
so on. There is no guidance on the technical aspects of the container or seal-checking either. 
Thus a very sensitive task is degraded into a mundane one. Hence in such circumstances how 
can, if at all, the security agency assist in allaying the risk concerns of the custodian? 
 
There are seldom, if any, specifically laid down guidelines for discharging security functions 
and duties. There are no mandatory or even recommended Rules of Use of Force (RUF) for 
the private security agencies. They vary with the stated (or unstated) objectives and 
instructions of the facility in-charge. As ports/airports/dry ports are plum targets for 
criminals, preventing unauthorized access across the perimeter is an important activity for the 
private security agency. Naturally there are some determined criminals who need to be 
prevented from unauthorized entry only by use (or the threat of use) of firearms.  
 
However, legal regimes of most nations strictly restrict the use of firearms and they can be 
used only for the purpose of „personal defense‟. Being a weapon of personal defense, the 
liability for using firearms lies solely with the individual guard. Thus the consequence of the 
total liability for firing the weapon without the need for „personal defense‟ is that of the 
individual guard. Hence the guards are reluctant to use the weapon, even when warranted by 
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the situation. The criminals are well aware of this reluctance of the guards to fire their 
weapon; as such the ports/airports/dry ports become extremely vulnerable to all manners of 
crime. In such circumstances there is no reason to believe that private security agencies 
provide or are capable of providing any superior security when compared to the in-house 
security. 
 
The Liability of Security Agencies 
 
The Custodian, when appointing the security agency, transfers the entire liability arising out 
of theft, pilferage or damages to cargo, property, machinery or equipment to the security 
agencies. However he can do so only if it could be conclusively proved that the security 
agency was directly responsible for the loss/theft of cargo. Thus the onus of proof lies with 
the Custodian. However, our research reveals that in spite the large number of containers 
transported to various inland destinations, the actual number of claims for shortage filed with 
Custodians is negligible. As such the security agencies are rarely if ever held responsible for 
theft/shortages of cargoes. This is despite the widely acknowledged belief that cargo theft is a 
serious problem in most countries and is particularly more so in emerging economies like 
India.  
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he actual reason for such under reporting of loss/theft is a question that warrants 
additional research. However according to anecdotal information received by us (on 
the condition of confidentiality), there is a suggestion that the cargo interests prefer 
to absorb the losses rather than report it as the process of reporting and filing of claims is time 
consuming and mostly fruitless. This is because it is difficult to precisely locate the point at 
which pilferage from a container might have occurred in the entire journey. It becomes even 
more daunting particularly if, the container has arrived with no evidence of tampering of the 
seal.  
 
At any given moment, the total worth of cargo and other property under the protection of the 
security agency could easily be more than a thousand times the net worth of the security 
agency. More often than not, it would not be possible to recover a serious quantity of money 
from the concerned agency, as compensation for any serious loss. In the worst-case scenario, 




The outsourcing of security services by Custodians has become a norm everywhere. The 
entire exercise is primarily motivated by considerations of reducing labor costs and related 
liabilities while the Custodians continue to remain liable for all the acts of commission and 
omission of the Security Agency. We believe that professionalization and empowerment of 
security agencies will become imperative as the risk perceptions assume serious proportions 
and losses begin to cut deeper into the bottom lines of cargo interests. Perhaps this has 
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An Exclusive Interview with 
Prof. Dr. Hans-Dietrich Haasis 
 
Make the Noodle Soup Delicious 
An interview by Dr Girish Gujar and Ms Fang Zhang 
 
ecently we had the good fortune to meet 
Prof. Haasis and solicit his views on the 
latest development in global logistics in 
general and European logistics in particular. In an 
extensive freewheeling interaction with us Prof. 
Haasis emphasized the importance of underlying 
regional culture, philosophy and work ethics on 
which the manufacturing industry as a whole, of 
which supply chain management forms an important 
component, is founded upon. He went on to expound 
the necessity of developing a holistic perspective 
while understanding and analyzing the logistics and 
supply chain management policies being practiced 
and adopted by a region. 
 
What is the USP of North European 
Hinterland Logistics vis-à-vis South 
European and East European logistics 
systems? 
 
Prof. Haasis: To begin with, there was a very strong 
bond between the various logistics service providers 
such as the rail, road and barge operators. 
Furthermore the ports, airports and inland logistics 
centers (colloquial termed as Freight villages) also 
cooperate closely (while continuing to compete with 
each other) with an objective of providing value 
added services to their customers. All these aspects 
result in the North European Ports in the 
Le-Havre-Hamburg range gaining competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis the South European Ports in the 
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However this competitive advantage of the North European Ports would be short lived as 
improved technology and better port managerial practices implemented by the global port 
operators such as APM, PSA and DPW would make strategically located South European 
Ports like Koper, Trieste and Rijeka more competitive, thus giving the La-Havre-Hamburg 
range ports a run for their money.  
 
What’s your opinion on the European Union’s adoption of more equitable 
policies by bailing out the Southern European states like Greece, Italy and 
Spain? 
 
Prof. Haasis: I feel that finance would not be an obstacle in developing the infrastructure in 
this region. I am even optimistic about Black Sea and Aegean Sea ports such as Constanza 
and Thessaloniki, particularly where the European Union Far East trade is concerned. The 
possibility of Southern Turkish ports providing a land bridge to North Europe at some point 
in future could not ruled out either, provided the bottleneck in the form of Bosporus straits 
could be resolved successfully. However as far as the European Union United States trade is 
concerned the Le-Havre-Hamburg range ports would continue to have an upper hand due to 
better productivity and higher efficiency.  
 
What about the development of Freight Villages in the North European region 
and what are the advantages of those Villages? 
 
Prof. Haasis: I was very impressed with the growth and development of Freight Villages in 
the North European region at Duisburg, Venlo, Tilburg and Breda. This region is well served 
by the Rhine river system which provides excellent connectivity to the Le-Havre-Hamburg 
range ports as well as to various industries located in this region famously termed as the Blue 
Banana. 
 
The freight villages not only accord a platform to service providers but also facilitate 
information and knowledge flows which is conducive to agglomeration of industrial clusters. 
These freight villages also act as extended gates of the Le-Havre-Hamburg range ports thus 
enhancing their capacity and efficiency.  
 
Another major advantage of Freight Villages is their proximity to the markets. This aspect 
permits them to delay their decision making to the very last moment thus degrading risk and 
enhancing reliability and customer satisfaction. It also means lower costs and higher profit 
margins. These freight villages thus provided connectivity between numerous converging 
supply chains and permitted the integration of benefits availed by mass production 
“Massification” with individual wants desires and tastes “Atomization”. In a value addiction 
pyramid, the freight villages occupy the middle region and connect Macro-Logistics with 
Micro-Logistics. This function is termed as Meso-Logistics where information gets converted 
into knowledge.  
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As regards sustainability and lowering of carbon emission, do you have any 
suggestions?  
 
Prof. Haasis: The development of such freight villages and facilitation of information and 
knowledge flows also leads to lowering of carbon emissions and adoption of sustainable 
supply chain management practices. It also aims at shifting freight traffic from road to rail 
and promotion of short sea shipping. There is a need of a regulator/coordinator that could 
help in enhancing the effectiveness and reliability of the supply chains. Transfract or 
Combifaweks could be adopted as good role models for playing such a role. Also, the 
importance of subsidies for encouraging sustainable supply chains cannot be ignored. 
 
What will be the impact of future development in technology on efficiency of 
hinterland logistics? 
 
Prof. Haasis: The impact would be more felt in logistics processes, information analysis and 
cargo flow controls within the hinterland logistics rather than in the cargo handling hardware 
systems in the ports. Specifically, the role of hand held smart devices and cloud computing 
will be important. It would also result in the elimination of waste and sharing of transport and 
storage capacities thus optimizing the overall supply chain competencies. 
 
What’s your view about the container security? 
 
Prof. Haasis: The present security initiatives and cargo scanning equipment are unlikely to 
satisfactorily resolve the issue of container security as the identity of responsibility for 
security failure is ambiguous. As such the container transportation process should be made 
more transparent and visible by the additional use of various cargos and container tracking 
devices such as RFID‟s and satellite transponders. I myself strongly back the usage of 
electronic seals. 
 
The carriers as well as inland transporters should exercise caution before accepting cargo by 
making all efforts to verify the various cargo interest as well as examining the cargo before 
issuing bills of lading. Stakeholders should increase their awareness of container security 
related issues by adopting more cooperative policies. However, 100% security was a chimera 
and not possible in real life. The more pragmatic solution for this problem is better quality 
control.  
 
What are your thoughts on the critical importance of training education and 
knowledge sharing? 
 
Prof. Haasis: The world faces the threat from complacency and the lack of soft skills, such 
as communication and interpersonal interaction skills. I opined the need for greater 
interaction between industry, academics and governments. A good case in point is the 
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 “Beerufs Academies” or vocational training institutes set up in Germany where real life case 
studies faced by the industry are discussed and resolved. Such examples need to be emulated 
in other countries too. In order to do so the industry should increasingly adopt corporate 
social responsibility policies and the government should encourage such initiatives by 
offering more scholarships and encouraging international student exchange programs. To 
conclude, not all logistics policies adopted by European Union can be replicated in totality. 
They need to be customized according to local and regional demands and conditions. On the 
whole, the entire logistics “Noodle Soup” needs to be delicious in order to maximize 
customer satisfaction and not just made from a few strands of noodles or some bits of 
ingredients. What goes into making the soup delicious will naturally vary from place to place 
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Development of the Cross-Border 
Transport Infrastructure 
 
Dr Varvara Krechetova 
Program Officer (Transport) 
Tumen Secretariat 
United Nations Development Programme, China 
Overview 
 
Growing economic interdependency creates enormous 
demand for connectivity at international level. Goods and 
people move across borders and the level of efficiency of 
this process has a deep impact on economic development 
on the both sides of the border. The part of transport 
infrastructure that is used for international delivery and 
travel is referred to as cross-border transport 
infrastructure. This can be roads, railways and bridges 
that pass through the border, and ports (sea, river, lakes) 
that are entry points for international freight and 
passengers. 
 
part from usual transport planning, technical and 
financial aspects, development of such 
cross-border infrastructure requires international 
agreement to establish a border crossing point (BCP) and 
set its management rules and operations schedule; 
construction of facilities to allow for customs, quarantine, 
and immigration checks; and adjustment/creation of the 
transport and cross-border movement domestic regulations 
to facilitate transport movement.  
 
The first point is quite straightforward and in practice it might mean additional agreements or 
amendments to the existing ones on border management. Examples from Northeast Asia 
would be 
 
1) addition of the four new BCPs (Ceke - Shivee Khuren, Arxan – Sumber, Mandal – Hangi, 
Ebuduge - Bayan Hushuu) to the China-Mongolia Agreement on China-Mongolia border 
crossing points and their management system in 2004 that replaced the previous one of 
1991;   
 
2) separate China – Russia Agreement on joint construction, operation, maintaining and 
management of railway border crossing bridge over Amur river (Heilongjiang) at the 
A 
Dr Varvara Krechetova 
Program Officer (Transport) 
Tumen Secretariat 
United Nations Development 
Programme, China 
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section of Russia - China state border in the vicinity of settlement Nizhneleninskoe of 
Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Russia) and Tongjiang city of the Heilongjiang  province 
(China) of 2008.  
 
The way in which the countries agree on the BCPs depends on their previous practices. 
Domestic regulations also have to be adjusted to accommodate budget expenses on the new 
BCPs, their staffing requirements and to guarantee the opening of the new passage.   
 
The second point means that apart from construction of a road, railway, ferry berth, or bridge 
and installation of respective equipment, a border crossing requires the design and building of 
inspection facilities, storages facilities, loading/unloading complexes depending on what are 
differences in technical standards on both sides of the border, and what transport and custom 
facilitation measures are adopted by the proponent governments. For example, whether 
paperless trade procedures are adopted, whether single window technologies are available, 
and what share of the vehicles or containers are subjected to control by the risk management 
standards, and so on. Decisions to implement joint customs control (such as Zamyn Uud 
(Mongolia)-Erenhot (China), Kalzhat (Kazakhstan) – Dulaty (China) implemented in Central 
Asian Regional Economic Cooperation) or single stop inspection (Lao-Bao (Laos) – 
Dansavanh (Vietnam) under Greater Mekong Sub-region) would influence both design and 
construction costs and their division as well.  
  
 Source: GTI Secretariat, http://www.tumenprogramme.org/ 
 
The last point is that transport facilitation is an important part of cross-border transport 
development: regulations and “soft” infrastructure are no less important than the facilities 
themselves. For instance, when opening a new BCP, relevant authorities of bordering 
countries should ensure that the road is within the list of the routes allowed for bilateral 
vehicle access in case the other country vehicle is not allowed to travel along the whole 
domestic network but only on agreed routes (situation on China-Russia border). In case if 
joint custom control or single window is agreed to be implemented, the national legislation 
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should allow their usage as well as access of the other party‟s inspection staff on a daily basis. 
As a rule, for any measure of an international (bilateral or multilateral) agreement respective 
domestic legislation should be amended to put it into force. 
 
ifferent approaches to the cross-border investments exist: setting up a joint company 
that carries out the work after being capitalised by both parties; or setting up two 
companies and task each with constructing up to an agreed point between the 
borders, capitalized again either by proponent governments or public companies in the sector. 
There are a number of public-private partnership forms available for these cases: for instance, 
build, operate, transfer (BOT); design, build, finance and operate (BDFO). As a side note, in 
all the cases, these companies are concentrated on transport facilities per se; separate 
domestic discussions are on-going on how to finance related inspection facilities. Normally, it 
is a task for customs and border authorities and strong commitment of the governments is 
needed to ensure timely construction of such inspection facilities. Next, driving forces that 
push cross-border connections into existence might originate from 1) purely bilateral trade, 
tourism and business needs and/or 2) from the prospective of international freight and 
passenger flows. 
 
In the first case, the cross-border link might be in the interest of the countries as a whole or in 
the interest of the bordering regions (provinces, municipalities, etc.) from both sides of the 
border. Careful planning and thorough analysis of the existing networks is required before 
actual investments to decide on desirable capacity and junction points to wider networks for 
optimal balance of local and central benefits and costs. An example is the length of discussion 
between China and Russia on the number of bridge border crossings to be constructed in 
Heilongjiang province (China)/Amurskaya oblast and Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Russia): 
the discussion has continued since early 1990. 
 
The second case is when cross-border facilities construction follows international 
arrangements, such as those reached under the auspices of UN ESCAP Asian Highway 
Network Agreement, 2003, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway 
Network, 2006, Intergovernmental Agreement on Dry Ports, 2013, or agreements on 
establishment and development of particular international transport corridors.  
 
There are multiple examples of transport corridors initiatives in different regions of the World. 
They might be focused on single corridor, such as Maputo Corridor (South Africa – 
Mozambique) or TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) or a regional 
grouping might promote creation of a network of regional corridors, as it is done by European 
Union, Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation 
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A multilateral approach provides certain benefits to participating countries:  
 
1) Shared access to information on prospective freight and passenger flows, projects and 
developments that will have an impact on the flows size and directions for the whole 
region. This allows the parties to take into account the wider picture while planning 
domestic transport networks and its cross-border connections.   
 
2) Coordination in planning of the corridors, including routing, modes, technical standards 
and timing that makes room for the increase of the efficiency of the cross-border and 
domestic investments in participating countries. 
 
3) Creation of a multilateral commitment to transport facilitation and conditions for the 
respective measures to be implemented along the corridor in time to allow smooth 
movement of freight and people as soon as possible after the transport corridor was 
agreed upon. 
 
4) The presence of multilateral commitment also attracts international donors and their 
consortiums as well as creates conditions for the private sector to invest in the transport 
facilities (logistic terminals, loading facilities, storages, etc.). This commitment has 
several aspects: from financial (guarantees on investments, preferential loans) to business 
(ensuring certain cargo base and respective investment in creation of one if needed) and 
regulative (companies are able to count on transport and custom facilitation that will 
reduce their transaction and operation costs). 
 
The multilateral approach is not the opposite to the bilateral though: coming to the particular 
points along the corridors approved for development by several partner countries, the 
construction projects themselves still becomes domestic or bilateral issues. This is the 
unavoidable technical aspect of the development of the cross-border transport infrastructure.  
 
The above benefits are strong enough to bring countries together to discuss transport issues 
even in the face of apparent individual costs of cross-border construction. This is true for 
regional groupings heavily supported by international donors where the financial aid and 
technical assistance are apparent benefits, such as GMS and CAREC. These are supported by 
a team of donors including Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, the 
United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank. GTI is a good example of 
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GTI member countries, China, Mongolia, Republic of Korea (ROK) and Russia, whose 
cooperation stems from 1995 agreement promoted by United Nations Development 
Programme, deem creation of a fully operational and efficient transport network with wide 
coverage in Northeast Asia (NEA) as the backbone for overall regional economic 
prosperity. This vision led them to increase the scope of cooperation from a narrow area at 
the borders of China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia to the 
current one that includes eastern Mongolia, Northeast China, ROK, and Russian 
Primorsky Territory; in the same time, DPRK is still considered as important prospective 
partner in NEA for transport network development.  
Source: GTI Secretariat, http://www.tumenprogramme.org/  
 
ooperation between the four countries allows them to take a comprehensive 
approach when designing their domestic railways, roads and ports, making bilateral 
arrangements on border crossing connections, taking into consideration not only 
bilateral flows, but potential regional ones. One important factor is the development of the 
mining sector in Mongolia (Tavan Tolgoi coal, Oyu Tolgoi copper, etc.) and the respective 
generated freight. For instance, these flows are the strategic justification of development of 
Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar – Baruun Urt – Khuut – Sumber) – China (Arxan – Ulan Hot 
–Changchun –Hunchun) – Russia (Makhalino – Zarubino) transport corridor (Tumen 
Transport Corridor). To have a clearer picture on the regional freight flows and their 
prospects, member countries jointly carried out the Integrated Transport Infrastructure and 
Cross-Border Facilitation Study for the Trans-GTR Transport Corridors
26
 and based on the 
results developed GTI Regional Transport Strategy. Since GTI is not backed by a financial 
                                                        
26
 Available at GTI web-site: http://www.tumenprogramme.org/?info-584-1.html. 
C 
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institute and, apart from Mongolia and China, other parties are not eligible for aid financing 
by donors, member countries are accepting that they are fully responsible for the 
implementation. The work is under way:  
 
 China and Russia are in active cooperation and negotiations on Tongjiang (China) – 
Nizhneleninskoe (Russia) bridge BCP, Heihe (China) – Blagoveschensk (Russia) bridge 
BCP with a number of agreements signed and construction companies set up;  
 Russian Railways completed modernization of Russian part of Hunchun (China) – 
Makhalino (Russia) railway;  
 Russian Railways in cooperation with Rajin Port are working on modernization of Rajin 
(DPRK) – Khasan (Russia) Railway and Rajin port modernization.  
 Hunchun (China) – Makhalino (Russia) railway was reopened for regular traffic in 
December 2013. 
 
In 2013, GTI member countries established an unique mechanism that allows coordinated 
financing in all GTI countries: Association of NEA EXIM Banks Association. This flexible 
mechanism is formalised at the moment via a memorandum of understanding signed in 
2012-2013 by Export-Import Bank of China, Development Bank of Mongolia, Export-Import 
Bank of Korea, Vnesheconombank (Russia). The Association principles are: equal access to 
the information on available projects, independence in loan applications appraisal and 
approval and a focus on hard infrastructure projects in GTI covered area. Members of the 
association are now discussing the projects that might be financed under the Association 
framework, based on Regional Transport Strategy and GTI member governments‟ proposals.  
 


















            Source: GTI Secretariat, http://www.tumenprogramme.org/  
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